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There is a widely held belief that individual short-term optimization is at odds with long-
term sustainability of an ecological-economic system. In this paper, we want to take a
fresh look at this position. We show that for typical ecosystems and under plausible and
standard assumptions about individual decision making, short-term optimization leads to
sustainable outcomes. In particular, in order to explain the sustainable use of ecosystems,
it is not necessary to assume preferences for sustainability – or any special concern for the
distant future – on the part of the decision maker; it suﬃces to assume that the decision
maker is risk averse.
The ecological-economic system under study here is grazing in semi-arid rangelands.
Semi-arid regions cover two thirds of the Earth’s land surface. They are characterized
by low and highly variable precipitation. Their utilization in livestock farming provides
the livelihood for a large part of the local populations. But semi-arid ecosystems are
extremely sensitive: over-utilization and non-adapted grazing strategies lead to environ-
mental problems such as desertiﬁcation.
Grazing in semi-arid rangelands is a prime object of study for ecological economics, as
the ecological and economic systems are tightly coupled (e.g. Beukes et al. 2002, Heady
1999, Janssen et al. 2004, Perrings 1997, Perrings and Walker 1997, 2004, Westoby et
al. 1989). The grass biomass is directly used as forage for livestock, which is the main
source of income; and the grazing pressure from livestock farming directly inﬂuences the
ecological dynamics. The crucial link is the grazing management.
The ecological dynamics, and thus, a farmer’s income, essentially depend on the low
and highly variable rainfall. The choice of a properly adapted grazing management
strategy is crucial in two respects: ﬁrst, to maintain the rangeland system as an income
base, that is, to prevent desertiﬁcation; and second, to smooth out income ﬂuctuations,
in particular, to avoid high losses in the face of droughts.
Assuming that the farmer is non-satiated in income and risk averse, we analyze the
choice of a grazing management strategy from two perspectives. On the one hand, we
determine the farmer’s short-term optimal grazing management strategy. We show that
a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy in order to obtain ‘insurance’ from the ecosystem
(Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2005). That is, the optimal strategy reduces income variability
2at the expense of yielding less mean income than possible.
On the other hand, we analyze the long-term ecological and economic impact of diﬀer-
ent strategies. We conclude that the more risk averse a farmer is, the more conservative
and the more sustainable is his short-term optimal grazing management strategy. In
short, in the context of grazing in semi-arid regions, risk aversion implies sustainability.
The literature on grazing management under uncertainty mainly analyzes the choice of
a stocking rate of livestock, as this is the most important aspect of rangeland management
(e.g. Hein and Weikard 2004, Karp and Pope 1984, McArthur and Dillon 1971, Perrings
1997, Rodriguez and Taylor 1988, Torell et al. 1991, Westoby et al. 1989). The innovative
analytical approach taken here is to consider the choice of a grazing management strategy,
which is a rule about the stocking rate to apply in any given year depending on the
rainfall in that year. This is inspired by empirical observations in Southern Africa. Rule-
based grazing management has the twofold advantage that a farmer has to make a choice
(concerning the rule) only once, and yet, keeps a certain ﬂexibility and scope for adaptive
management (concerning the stocking rate). The ﬂexibility thus obtained is the decisive
advantage of choosing a constant rule over choosing a constant stocking rate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss grazing management in
semi-arid rangelands in more detail and describe one particular ‘good practice’-example:
the Gamis Farm, Namibia. In Section 3, we develop a dynamic and stochastic ecological-
economic model, which captures the essential aspects and principles of grazing manage-
ment in semi-arid rangelands, and features the key aspect of the Gamis-strategy. Our
results are presented in Section 4, with all derivations and proofs given in the Appendix.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Grazing management in semi-arid rangelands: The
Gamis Farm, Namibia
The ecological dynamics of semi-arid regions are essentially driven by low and highly vari-
able precipitation (Behnke et al. 1993, Sullivan and Rhode 2002, Westoby et al. 1989).1
1Another important driver of ecological dynamics in semi-arid rangelands is the stochastic occurrence
of ﬁre (Janssen et al. 2004, Perrings and Walker 1997, 2004). In our case, ﬁre plays only a minor role,
3Sustainable economic use of these ecosystems requires an adequate adaption to this en-
vironment. The only sensible economic use, which is indeed predominant (Mendelsohn
et al. 2002), is by extensive livestock grazing. For this purpose, sophisticated grazing
management strategies have been developed. For example, the ‘opportunistic’ grazing
management strategy (e.g. Beukes et al. 2002: 238) simply matches the herd size with
available forage in every year. This is done by de-stocking when there is little forage
in the dry years, and restocking when more forage is available in years with suﬃcient
rainfall.
One example of a more sophisticated and particularly successful management system
has been employed for forty years at the Gamis Farm, Namibia (M¨ uller et al. 2004,
Stephan et al. 1996, 1998a, 1998b). The Gamis Farm is located 250 km southwest of
Windhoek in Namibia (24050S 16300E) close to the Naukluft mountains at an altitude of
1,250 m. The climate of this arid region is characterized by low mean annual precipitation
(177 mm/y) and high variability (variation coeﬃcient: 56 percent). The vegetation type
is dwarf shrub savanna (Giess 1998); the grass layer is dominated by the perennial grasses
Stipagrostis uniplumis, Eragrostis nindensis and Triraphis ramosissima (Maurer 1995).
Karakul sheep (race Swakara) are bred on an area of 30,000 hectares. The primary
source of revenue is from the sale of lamb pelts. Additionally, the wool of the sheep is sold.
In good years, up to 3,000 sheep are kept on the farm. An adaptive grazing management
strategy is employed to cope with the variability in forage. The basis of the strategy is
a rotational grazing scheme: the pasture land is divided into 98 paddocks, each of which
is grazed for a short period (about 14 days) until the palatable biomass on that paddock
is used up completely, and then is rested for a minimum of two months. This system
puts high pressure on the vegetation for a short time to prevent selective grazing (Heady
1999). While such a rotational grazing scheme is fairly standard throughout semi-arid
regions, the farmer on the Gamis Farm has introduced an additional resting: in years
with suﬃcient precipitation one third of the paddocks are given a rest during the growth
period (September - May). In years with insuﬃcient rainfall this rest period is reduced
or completely omitted. Once a year, at the end of the rainy season (April), the farmer
determines – based on actual rainfall and available forage – how many paddocks will be
but the stochasticity of rainfall is crucial (M¨ uller et al. 2004).
4rested and, thus, how many lambs can be reared. This strategy is a particular example of
what has been called ‘rotational resting’ (Heady 1970, 1999, Stuth and Maraschin 2000;
Quirk 2002).
The grazing management system employed at the Gamis Farm has been successful
over decades, both in ecological and economic terms. It, therefore, represents a model
for commercial farming in semi-arid rangelands.
3 The model
Our analysis is based on an integrated dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model,
which captures essential aspects and principles of grazing management in semi-arid re-
gions. It represents a non-equilibrium dynamic ecosystem, which is driven by stochastic
precipitation, and a risk averse farmer, who rationally chooses a grazing management
strategy under uncertainty.
3.1 Precipitation
Uncertainty is introduced into the model by the stochasticity of rainfall, which is assumed
to be an independent and identically distributed (iid) random variable. For semi-arid ar-
eas, a log-normal distribution of rainfall r(t) is an adequate description (Sandford 1982).2
The log-normal distribution, with probability density function f(r) (Equation A.17), is
determined by the mean µr and standard deviation σr of precipitation. Here, we measure
precipitation in terms of ‘ecologically eﬀective rain events’, i.e. the number of rain events
during rainy season with a suﬃcient amount of rainfall to be ecologically productive
(M¨ uller et al. 2004).
3.2 Grazing management strategies
The farm is divided into a number I ∈ IN of identical paddocks, numbered by i ∈
{1,...,I}. In modeling grazing management strategies, we focus on the aspect of addi-
tional resting during the growth period, which is the innovative element in the Gamis
2While the distribution of rainfall r(t) is exogenous, all other random variables in the model follow
an induced distribution.
5grazing system. The strategy is applied in each year, after observing the actual rainfall
at the end of the rainy season. Its key feature is that in dry years all paddocks are
used, while in years with suﬃcient rainfall a pre-speciﬁed fraction of paddocks is rested.
Whether resting takes place, and to what extent, are the deﬁning elements of what we
call the farmer’s grazing management strategy:
Deﬁnition 1
A grazing management strategy (α,r) is a rule of how many paddocks are not grazed in
a particular year given the actual rainfall in that year, where α ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of
paddocks rested if rainfall exceeds the threshold value r ∈ [0,∞).3
Thus, when deciding on the grazing management strategy, the farmer decides on two
variables: the rain threshold r and the fraction α of rested paddocks. While the rule is
constant (i.e. α =const., r =const.) its application may yield a diﬀerent stocking with
livestock in any given year depending on actual rainfall in that year. Note that the
‘opportunistic’ strategy (e.g. Beukes et al. 2002: 238) is the special case without resting,
i.e. α = 0.
3.3 Ecosystem dynamics
Both the stochastic rainfall and grazing pressure are major determinants of the ecolog-
ical dynamics. Following Stephan et al. (1998a), we consider two quantities to describe
the state of the vegetation in each paddock i at time t: the green biomass Gi(t) and
the reserve biomass Ri(t) of a representative grass species,4 both of which are random
variables, since they depend on the random variable rainfall. The green biomass captures
all photosynthetic (‘green’) parts of the plants, while the reserve biomass captures the
non-photosynthetic reserve organs (‘brown’ parts) of the plants below or above ground
(Noy-Meir 1982). The green biomass grows during the growing season in each year and
dies almost completely in the course of the dry season. The amount Gi(t) of green biomass
available on paddock i in year t after the end of the growing season depends on rainfall
3We assume that the number I of paddocks is so large that we can treat α as a real number.
4We assume that a rotational grazing scheme is employed, such that selective grazing is completely
prevented, i.e. there is no competitive disadvantage for more palatable grasses (see e.g. Beukes et al.
2002). Hence, we consider a single, representative species of grass.
6r(t) in the current year, on the reserve biomass Ri(t) on that paddock, and on a growth
parameter wG:
G
i(t) = wG · r(t) · R
i(t). (1)
As the green biomass in the current year does not directly depend on the green biomass
in past years, it is a ﬂow variable rather than a stock.
In contrast, the reserve biomass Ri(t) on paddock i in year t is a stock variable. That
is, the reserve biomass parts of the grass survive several years (‘perennial grass’). Thereby,
the dynamics of the vegetation is not only inﬂuenced by the current precipitation, but also
depends on the precipitation of preceding years (O’Connor and Everson 1998). Growth



















where d is a constant death rate of the reserve biomass, and wR is a growth parameter. A
density dependence of reserve biomass growth is captured by the factors containing the
capacity limits K: The higher the reserve biomass on paddock i, the slower it grows. The
status variable xi captures the impact of grazing on the reserve biomass of paddock i. If
paddock i is grazed in the current year, we set xi = 1, if it is rested, we set xi = 0. The
parameter c (with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1) describes the amount by which reserve biomass growth is
reduced due to grazing pressure. For simplicity, we assume that the initial (t = 1) stock
of reserve biomass of all paddocks is equal,
R
i(1) = R for all i = 1,...,I. (3)
3.4 Livestock and income







i.e. the herd size is limited by total available forage, which equals the green biomass
Gi of all grazed paddocks i with xi = 1. Here, we assume that the farmer can (and
5We normalize the units of green biomass in such a way that one unit of green biomass equals the
need of one livestock unit per year.
7will) adapt the herd size to the available forage and to his chosen grazing management
strategy without any cost or beneﬁt. That is, de-stocking does not generate revenue, and
re-stocking is possible at no cost.6
The herd size S(t) determines the farmer’s income y(t). We assume that the quantity
of marketable products from livestock is identical to the herd size S(t) at time t.7 The
farmer sells his products on a world market at a given price p, which is constant over
time. Thus, the farmer’s income y(t) is
y(t) = p · S(t). (5)
Since the herd size S(t) is a random variable, income y(t) is a random variable, too. In
order to simplify the notation in the subsequent analysis, we normalize the product price
to
p ≡ (wG · I · R)
−1. (6)
This means, from now on, we measure product value in units of total forage per unit of
precipitation.
Given the actual rainfall r in the ﬁrst grazing period, the initial reserve biomass
(Equation 3) and a grazing management rule (α,r), the herd size S ≡ S(1) is determined
by Equation (4). Inserting Equation (1) and using Assumption (3), as well as standard-
ization (6), the farmer’s income y ≡ y(1) at the end of the ﬁrst grazing period is given











1 if r ≤ r
1 − α if r > r
. (7)
Given the probability density distribution f(r) of rainfall, the mean µy(α,r) and the
6Assuming costs of de- and restocking would not fundamentally alter our results, but potentially
re-enforce our central result (Result 3 below).
7That is, the quantity of marketable products is proportional to the herd’s biomass and units are
normalized in an appropriate way.
8standard deviation σy(α,r) of income are (see Appendix A.1)























where µr and σr are the mean and the standard deviation of rainfall.
The model, as it has been speciﬁed so far,8 implies that a conservative strategy has a
positive long-term impact on reserve biomass and, thus, on future income. In addition,
there is a positive immediate eﬀect of resting on income, which has not been captured so
far. Income losses in the face of drought are smaller with resting than under a strategy
without resting, since forage is available on rested paddocks. This eﬀect will be captured
indirectly by Assumption 1 below.
3.5 Farmer’s choice of grazing management strategy
We assume that the farmer’s utility only depends on income y, and that he is a non-





(1 + δ)t−1 (10)
be his von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, where δ is the discount rate,
the Bernoulli utility function v(·) is a strictly concave function of income y, and Et is
the expectancy operator at time t. In particular, we will employ a utility function with





where ρ > 0 is the constant parameter which measures the degree of relative risk aversion
(Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 194).
8That is, Equations (1) – (7) plus the assumption that rainfall r(t) is an iid random variable which
follows a log-normal distribution.
9The farmer will choose the grazing management strategy which maximizes his von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function (10). In order to analyze this choice,
the basic idea is to regard the choice of a grazing management strategy as the choice
of a ‘lottery’ (Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2005). Each possible lottery is characterized
by the probability distribution of pay-oﬀ, where the pay-oﬀ is given by the farmer’s
income y(t) ∈ IR+, and the (log-normal) probability distribution is characterized by
the mean income µy(t) and the standard deviation σy(t) of income. Given the ecological
dynamics, both the mean income and the standard deviation solely depend on the grazing
management strategy applied. Thus, choosing a grazing management strategy implies
choosing a particular distribution of income.
We assume that the farmer initially, i.e. at t = 0 prior to the ﬁrst grazing period,
chooses a grazing management strategy (α,r), which is then applied in all subsequent
years. This is a simple form of adaptive management. However, it is more sophisticated
than the ‘opportunistic’ strategy. Thereby, when choosing the strategy, the farmer does
not know which amount of rainfall will actually occur, but he knows the probability
distribution of rainfall and he has full knowledge of the ecosystem. As a result, he knows
the probability distribution of his income for any possible grazing management strategy.






(1 + δ)t−1 s.t. (1),(2),(3),(4),(5). (12)
In order to focus on short-term optimization, we consider the extreme case of a farmer
with a planning horizon of T = 1. This means that prior to the ﬁrst grazing period, the
farmer chooses the grazing management strategy which maximizes his expected utility
for this period only. Hence, the farmer’s decision problem (12) reduces to optimizing
the ﬁrst-period expected utility. Concerning the probability distribution of income, we
assume the following.
Assumption 1
The farmer’s income is log-normally distributed with mean µy(α,r) as given by (8) and
standard deviation σy(α,r) as given by (9).
That is, we replace the probability density function of the farmer’s income (7) by a log-



















Figure 1: A set of indiﬀerence curves of the risk averse farmer in the mean-standard
deviation space for log-normally distributed incomes and constant relative risk aversion
ρ = 1.
(i) The log-normal distribution is analytically convenient, as it allows us to completely
specify the problem in terms of mean µy and standard deviation σy, and to derive ana-
lytical results. (ii) It is an elegant and simple way of including short-term positive eﬀects
of resting on income because the occurrence of very low incomes, under the probability
distribution of income as given by Assumption 1, is less likely if resting is applied than if
no resting takes place (see Appendix A.1).
Using Assumption 1, the farmer’s expected utility for T = 1 can be calculated from
Equation (10) with the speciﬁcation (11) of the Bernoulli utility function v(y). It is given
















The indiﬀerence curves of the farmer’s utility function U can be drawn in the mean –
standard deviation space. Figure 1 shows such a set of indiﬀerence curves for a given
degree ρ of relative risk aversion. The indiﬀerence curves are increasing and convex if the
standard deviation is suﬃciently small compared to the mean, i.e. for (µy/σy)2 > 1 + ρ
(see Appendix A.3). The slope of the indiﬀerence curves is increasing in the degree of
relative risk aversion ρ (see Appendix A.3). In particular, the indiﬀerence curves are
horizontal lines for risk-neutral farmers, i.e. for ρ = 0.
11With Assumption 1, the farmer’s optimization problem is (using a monotonic trans-








ρ/2 s.t. (8) and (9). (14)
4 Results
The analysis proceeds in three steps (Results 1, 2 and 3 below): First, we analyze the
short-term optimization of the farmer. By choosing a grazing management strategy
(α,r) ∈ [0,1] × [0,∞), the farmer determines the mean and the standard deviation
(µy,σy) = (µy(α,r),σy(α,r)) of his income at the end of the ﬁrst grazing period. Thereby,
the farmer faces a trade-oﬀ between strategies which yield a high mean income at a high
standard deviation, and strategies which yield a low mean income at a low standard
deviation. The farmer in our model does not consider the distant future at all. This
is for the sake of analytical clarity: intertemporal eﬀects of the grazing management
strategies on the ecosystem dynamics are not taken into consideration in the farmer’s
decision.
Second, we analyze the long-term consequences of diﬀerent grazing management
strategies on the ecological-economic system. In particular, we study how the intertem-
poral development of the mean reserve biomass and the mean income depend on the
strategy.
Finally, we put the two parts of the analysis together and derive conclusions about how
the long-term sustainability of the short-term optimal strategy depends on the farmer’s
degree of risk aversion.
4.1 Feasible strategies and income possibility set
To start with, we deﬁne the income possibility set as the set of all mean incomes and
standard deviations of income (µy(α,r),σy(α,r)) ∈ (0,∞)×[0,∞), which are attainable
in the ﬁrst grazing period by applying a feasible management rule (α,r) ∈ [0,1]×[0,∞).
These are given by Equations (8) and (9). Figure 2 shows the income possibility set for
particular parameter values.

















Figure 2: The set of all means µy and standard deviations σy of the farmer’s income y,
each point denoting a separate strategy, as well as the income possibility frontier (thick
line). Parameter values are µr = 1.2 and σr = 0.7.
feasible strategies that yield the same mean income, but with a higher standard deviation
(or: the same standard deviation, but with a lower mean) than others. These strategies
can be excluded from the set of strategies from which the optimum is chosen by a risk
averse and non-satiated decision maker. In the following, we thus focus on the eﬃcient
strategies, which generate the income possibility frontier (Figure 2, thick line):
Deﬁnition 2
The income possibility frontier is the set of expected values µy and standard deviations
σy of income for which the following conditions hold:
1. (µy,σy) is in the income possibility set, i.e. it is feasible.
2. There is no (µ0
y,σ0
y) 6= (µy,σy) in the income possibility set with µ0
y ≥ µy and
σ0
y ≤ σy.
The question at this point is, ‘What are the grazing management strategies (α,r) that
generate the income possibility frontier?’ We call these strategies eﬃcient.
Lemma 1











Figure 3: The set of feasible strategies is given by the whole area α ∈ [0,1], r ∈ [0,∞).
The set of eﬃcient strategies for parameters µr = 1.2 and σr = 0.7 is the curve.
• Each point on the income possibility frontier is generated by exactly one (eﬃcient)
strategy.










for all r ∈ Ω. (15)
• α∗(r) has the following properties:
α
∗(0) = 1, lim
r→∞α
∗(r) = 0, and
dα∗(r)
dr
< 0 for all r ∈ Ω.
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
Figure 3 illustrates the lemma. Whereas the set of feasible strategies is the two-
dimensional area bounded by r = 0, α = 0, α = 1, the set of eﬃcient strategies, as given
by Equation (15), is a one-dimensional curve. Thus, the eﬃcient strategies are described
by only one parameter, r, while the other parameter α is determined by α = α∗(r)
(Equation 15). The curve α∗(r) is downward sloping: With a higher rain threshold r, i.e.
14if resting only takes place in years with higher precipitation, the eﬃcient share α∗(r) of
rested paddocks is smaller. In other words, for eﬃcient strategies, a higher rain threshold
r does not only mean that the condition for resting is less likely to be fulﬁlled, but also
that a smaller share α∗ of paddocks is rested if resting takes place. Hence, if an eﬃcient
strategy is characterized by a smaller r, we call it more conservative.
Knowledge of the eﬃcient strategies allows us to characterize the income possibility
frontier, and to establish a relationship between eﬃcient grazing management strategies
and the resulting means and standard deviations of income.
Lemma 2
The farmer’s expected income in the ﬁrst grazing period, µy(α,r) (Equation 8), is in-
creasing in r for all eﬃcient strategies:
dµy(α∗(r),r)
dr
> 0 for all r ∈ Ω.




Proof: see Appendix A.5.
For all eﬃcient strategies a higher rain threshold r for resting, i.e. a less conservative
strategy, implies a higher mean income. Whereas no resting, r = 0 (opportunistic strat-
egy), leads to the maximum possible mean income of µr, the opposite extreme strategy,
r → ∞ (no grazing at all), leads to the minimum possible income of zero. Overall,
a change in the grazing management strategy aﬀects both, the mean income and the
standard deviation of income.
Lemma 3
The income possibility frontier has the following properties:
• The income possibility frontier has two corners:
– The southwest corner is at σy = 0 and µy = 0. At this point, the income
possibility frontier is increasing with slope µr/σr.
– The northeast corner is at σy = σr and µy = µr. At this point, the income























Figure 4: The optimum for a risk averse farmer (ρ = 5.5, denoted by ∗) and a risk-neutral
farmer (ρ = 0, denoted by +).
• In between the two corners, the income possibility frontier is increasing and located
above the straight line from one corner to the other. It is S-shaped, i.e. from
southwest to northeast there is ﬁrst a convex segment and then a concave segment.
Proof: see Appendix A.6.
Figure 2 illustrates the lemma. The property, that the income possibility frontier is
increasing, suggests that resting acts like an insurance for the farmer. This means, by
choosing a more conservative grazing management strategy, the farmer can decrease his
risk (standard deviation) of income, but only at the price of a decreased mean income.
Thus, there is an insurance value associated with choosing a more conservative strategy
(Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2005).
4.2 Optimal strategy in the short-run
The optimal strategy results from both the farmer’s preferences (Figure 1) and the income
possibility frontier (Figure 2). It is determined by the mean µ∗
y and the standard devi-
ation σ∗
y, at which the indiﬀerence curve is tangential to the income possibility frontier




















Figure 5: The rain threshold r∗ of the optimal strategy as a function of the farmer’s
degree of risk aversion ρ. Parameter values are the same as in Figure 2.
Lemma 4
(i) If (µr/σr)
2 > 1 + ρ, the optimum (µ∗
y,σ∗
y) is unique.9
(ii) For ρ > 0, the optimum is an interior solution with 0 < µ∗
y < µr and 0 < σ∗
y < σr.
For ρ = 0, the optimum is a corner solution with µ∗
y = µr and σ∗
y = σr.
Proof: see Appendix A.7.
The optimal strategy crucially depends on the degree of risk aversion. In the particular
case of a risk-neutral farmer (ρ = 0), the strategy that yields the maximum mean,
irrespective of the standard deviation associated with it, is chosen. The optimal grazing
management strategy of such a risk-neutral farmer is the strategy without resting, i.e.
with r = ∞ (and, therefore, α = 0). That is, he employs an opportunistic strategy.
If the farmer is risk averse, he faces a trade-oﬀ between expected income and variability
of the income, because strategies that yield a higher mean income also display a higher
variability of income. This leads to the following result, which is illustrated in Figures 4
and 5.
Result 1
A unique interior solution (α∗(r∗),r∗) to the farmer’s decision problem (14), if it exists
9This is a suﬃcient condition which is quite restrictive. A unique optimum exists for a much larger
range of parameter values.
17(see Lemma 4), has the following properties:
(i) The more risk averse the farmer, the smaller are the mean µ∗
y and the standard
deviation σ∗
y of his income.





Proof: see Appendix A.8.
4.3 Intertemporal impact of grazing management strategies
To study the intertemporal ecological and economic impact of the grazing management
strategy chosen on the basis of short-term optimization (Problem 14), we assume that the
farmer continues to apply this strategy in every subsequent period. Under this assump-
tion, we compute the resulting probability distribution of income and reserve biomass over
several decades in the future.10 This calculation covers all eﬃcient strategies (α∗(r),r).
The results of the numerical computation are shown in Figure 6, which enables the com-
parison of the long-term impacts, both in ecological and economic terms, of the diﬀerent
strategies that are eﬃcient in the short-run. Their interpretation leads to the following
result.
Result 2
For parameter values which characterize typical semi-arid rangelands (i.e. wG, wR, µr
are small and c, σr are large) the long-term ecological impact is as stated in (i), and the
long-term economic impact is as stated in (ii):
(i) The more conservative the strategy, i.e. the lower r, the higher the mean reserve
biomass µR(t) in the future,
dµR(t)
dr
< 0 for all t > 1 and r ∈ Ω.













































































Figure 6: Relation between the grazing management strategy (given by the rain threshold
r) and future mean reserve biomass µR(t > 0) (in units of initial reserve biomass), as
well as future mean income µy(t > 0) for diﬀerent strategies on the income possibility
frontier. Parameter values are µr = 1.2, σr = 0.7, I · K = 8000, d = 0.15, wG = 1.2,
wR = 0.2, c = 0.5, I · R = 2400.
(ii) For high rain thresholds r ≥ ˆ r, the following holds: The more conservative the
strategy, i.e. the lower r, the higher the mean income in the long-term future for
t > ˆ t,
dµy(t)
dr
< 0 for all t > ˆ t and r ≥ ˆ r.
Proof: see Appendix A.9.
Result 2 states that the slope of the curves in Figure 6 is negative throughout, as far
as reserve biomass is concerned; and is negative for high r ≥ ˆ r and t > ˆ t, as far as income
is concerned. The smaller the rain threshold r in this domain, i.e. the more conservative
the strategy, the higher are the mean reserve biomass and the mean income in future
years, if the same strategy is applied over the whole period. This eﬀect is in line with
intuition for reserve biomass: the more conservative the strategy, the better is the state
of the rangeland in the future.
As far as income is concerned, the argument is less straightforward. In particular,
the mean income in the ﬁrst period is increasing in r (Lemma 2). A less conservative
strategy yields a higher mean income in this period, since more livestock is kept on the
rangeland. This holds for several periods in the near future (cf. the line for t = 10 in
19Figure 6b). However, in the long run (for t ≥ ˆ t ≈ 40), the strong grazing pressure on
the pasture leads to reduced reserve biomass growth and less forage production in the
long-term future, compared to a more conservative strategy. As a result, mean income is
smaller. This can be seen in Figure 6b: the curves are downward-sloping for suﬃciently
high t ≥ ˆ t and suﬃciently high r.11
The result states that the relationships between the strategy and the long-term impact
on the mean reserve biomass and mean income, depend on the parameters. As shown
in Appendix A.9 the assertions are true if the growth rates of the green and reserve
biomass are low, the impact of grazing on the growth of the reserve biomass is high, and
rainfall is low and highly variable. This is just the range of parameter values which is
adequate for semi-arid rangelands, because these are fragile ecosystems which are highly
susceptible to degradation if grazing pressure is high. For very robust ecosystems or very
low stochasticity of rainfall, however, the result is not valid.
For small rain thresholds r < ˆ r, a more conservative strategy (i.e. a smaller r) leads
to a lower mean income, not only in the ﬁrst period (Lemma 2), but also in the future.
In this domain of strategies, resting is already so high that the future gains in reserve
biomass from additional resting do not outweigh the losses from lower stocking.
Overall, the more conservative the strategy, i.e. the lower r, the higher the mean
reserve biomass and mean income in the long-term. In that sense, more conservative
strategies are more sustainable; whereby we understand sustainability, for the sake of
this analysis, in the following way.
Deﬁnition 3
A strategy A is called more sustainable than another strategy B, if and only if there
exists some point in time t0 such that for all t > t0 both the expected income and the
expected reserve biomass under strategy A are higher than under B.
In the framework of our model, this deﬁnition captures essential aspects of what has
been called ‘strong sustainability’ (Pearce et al. 1990, Neumayer 2003).12 It comprises an
11As can be seen in the ﬁgure, this eﬀect becomes stronger in the long-term future: the curves are
steeper for higher t.
12The notion of sustainability, while expressing an idea which seems obvious and clear at ﬁrst glance,
is notoriously diﬃcult to deﬁne in an operational way. As a result, there are a multitude of diﬀerent
20ecological as well as an economic dimension, with mean reserve biomass as an ecological
indicator and mean income as an economic indicator. It expresses the aspect of long-term
conservation of an ecological-economic system in the following sense. If we compare two
strategies, A and B, where A is more sustainable than B, then both the reserve biomass
and the income are better conserved until time t > t0 under A than under B. That is,
both have declined less on average between the ﬁrst period and period t under A than
under B.13
Combining Results 1 and 2, we can now make a statement about the relation between
the farmer’s short-term optimization and its long-term implications. From Result 1,
we know that the more risk averse a farmer is, the more conservative is his short-term
optimal strategy. From Result 2, we know that a more conservative strategy is also more
sustainable. This leads to the following result.
Result 3
The more risk averse the farmer, the more sustainable is his short-term optimal grazing
management strategy.
Result 3 sheds new light on the question ‘How can one explain that people do behave
in a sustainable way?’ For, Result 3 suggests the following potential explanation. That
a farmer A manages an ecosystem in a more sustainable manner than another farmer B,
may be explained simply by a higher risk aversion of farmer A. In particular, it is not
necessary to assume that farmer A has any kind of stronger preferences for future income
or sustainability than farmer B.
deﬁnitions of ‘sustainability’, which reveal diﬀerent aspects and, at bottom, fundamentally diﬀerent
understandings of the term. See e.g. Klauer (1999), Neumayer (2003)and Pezzey (1992) for a detailed
discussion.
13Furthermore, as far as the income criterion is concerned, Deﬁnition 3 includes an aspect of intertem-
poral eﬃciency. The formal criterion employed in Deﬁnition 3 is essentially the overtaking criterion
introduced by Koopmans (1965) and von Weizs¨ acker (1965), which can be seen as an attempt to deﬁne
intertemporal eﬃciency without making recourse to a discount rate.
215 Conclusions
We have developed an integrated dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of
grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. Within this, we have analyzed the choice
of grazing management strategies of a risk averse farmer, and the long-term ecological
and economic impact of diﬀerent strategies. We have shown that the more risk averse
a farmer is, the more conservative and sustainable is the short-term optimal strategy,
although the distant future is neglected in his optimization.
A more conservative use of the ecosystem generates less expected income in the present
than a less conservative use, but has beneﬁts in two respects: First, it may be regarded as
an investment in ecosystem quality, which enables higher future incomes from ecosystem
use. This is the common understanding of the purpose of a conservative ecosystem
management. We have shown that there is a second beneﬁt, in so far as a conservative use
of the rangeland reduces the variability of present income. In other words, conservative
ecosystem management provides insurance.
In our model the description of the farmer’s decision focuses on the second aspect. It
turns out that, in the face of uncertainty, higher risk aversion is suﬃcient to induce the
farmer to employ a more conservative and, thus, more sustainable ecosystem management.
However, one should not conclude from our analysis that risk aversion is suﬃcient to
ensure a sustainable development in semi-arid areas. This issue requires a variety of
further considerations.
In this analysis, we have focused on the environmental risk resulting from the uncer-
tainty of rainfall. Other forms of risk, e.g. uncertainty concerning property-rights, or the
stability of social and economic relations in general, might generate a tendency in the
opposite direction, and promote a less conservative and less sustainable management of
the ecosystem. Hence, in the face of diﬀerent uncertainties, the net eﬀect is not clear and
has to be analyzed in detail.
Additional sources of income (say from tourism) or the availability of ﬁnancial services
(such as savings, credits, or commercial insurance), constitute possibilities for hedging
income risk. For farmers, all these are substitutes for obtaining ‘insurance’ by conservative
ecosystem management and, thus, may induce farmers to choose less conservative and
less sustainable grazing management strategies. This becomes relevant as farmers in
22semi-arid regions are more and more embedded in world trade and have better access to
global commodity and ﬁnancial markets.
Our analysis was aimed at the speciﬁc context of grazing management in semi-arid
rangelands. This system is characterized by a strong interrelation between ecology and
economic use, which drives the results. While this is a very speciﬁc ecological-economic
system, the underlying principles and mechanisms of ecosystem functioning and economic
management are fairly general. Hence, we believe that there are similar types of econom-
ically used ecosystems, e.g. ﬁsheries or other agro-ecosystems, to which our results should
essentially carry over.
A Appendix
A.1 Probability distribution of income
















The two parameters mr and sr can be expressed in terms of the mean µr and standard
deviation σr, mr = lnµr − 1
2 ln(1 + σ2
r/µ2
r) and s2
r = ln(1 + σ2
r/µ2
r).
The probability density function (pdf) of income (Equation 7) is
˜ f(y) =

   
   












if r ≤ y
. (A.18)
Note that in the case without resting, i.e. α = 0 or r = ∞, the distribution of income
equals the distribution of rainfall, ˜ f(y) = f(y).
Proof: If rainfall is low, r ≤ r, income equals rainfall, y = r. If rainfall is high, resting
is applied and income is y = (1−α)r. Hence, an income y ∈ [y,y+dy], where y ≤ (1−α)r,
arises with probability f(y)dy. An income y ∈ [y,y+dy], where (1−α)r < y < r, arises
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To illustrate how Assumption 1 introduces (small) immediate positive eﬀects of resting






















r (1 − α)r
Figure 7: The probability density function (A.18) and the log-normal probability density
function with the same mean and standard deviation.
of income for a strategy (α,r) with resting, the black line the log-normal pdf with the
same mean and standard deviation. For small incomes y ≤ (1 − α)r, the pdf (A.18) of
income equals the log-normal distribution of rainfall (A.17). Hence, for small incomes the
pdf (A.18) of income resulting from a strategy with resting is equal to the pdf resulting
from the strategy without resting, which is (A.17).
This is diﬀerent for the log-normal distribution of income from Assumption 1, i.e.
the black line in Figure 7. Here, a range of very small incomes exists, for which the
24log-normal distribution of income resulting from a strategy with resting is below the pdf
resulting from the strategy without resting. The reason is that both the mean and the
standard deviation are the same for the pdf (A.18) and the log-normal distribution of
income, but the jump of the pdf (A.18) at y = (1−α)r is smoothed out by the log-normal
distribution.
Hence, very low incomes are less likely under the log-normal distribution of income
corresponding to strategy (α,r) than under a strategy without resting. This is the reason
why replacing the pdf (A.18) of income by the log-normal distribution is a convenient
way of including short-term positive income-eﬀects of resting in the model.
A.2 Expected utility function
With the speciﬁcation (11) of the farmer’s Bernoulli utility function v(y), and Assump-






















































































A.3 Properties of the indiﬀerence curves
Each indiﬀerence curve intersects the µy-axis at σy = 0. The point of intersection, µ0, is
the certainty equivalent of all lotteries on that indiﬀerence curve. Hence, the indiﬀerence






ρ/2 = µ0. (A.19)
25The slope of the indiﬀerence curve is obtained by diﬀerentiating Equation (A.19) with









The curvature is obtained by diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to σy, inserting




















which is positive, if and only if µ2
y > (1+ρ)σ2
y. Furthermore, the slope of the indiﬀerence

















A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
To ﬁnd the eﬃcient strategies, we ﬁrst determine the strategies which minimize the
standard deviation of income given the mean income. Out of these strategies those are
eﬃcient which maximize the mean income for a given standard deviation. Each point
on the income possibility frontier is generated by exactly one eﬃcient strategy, since the
solution of the corresponding minimization problem is unique.






y s.t. µy ≥ ¯ µy, α ∈ [0,1], r ∈ [0,∞). (A.22)









The Lagrangian for the minimization problem (A.22) is
L = σ
2
y(α,r) + λ[µy(α,r) − ¯ µy]
= σ
2
r + 2αµr R1(r) − α
2 R
2
1(r) − α(2 − α)R2(r) + λ[µr − αR1(r) − ¯ µy].
26The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂L
∂r
= 0 ⇔ αrf(r) [−2(µr − αR1(r)) + (2 − α)r] = − λαrf(r) (A.24)
∂L
∂α
= 0 ⇔ 2(µr − αR1(r))R1(r) − 2(1 − α)R2(r) = − λ [−R1(r)]. (A.25)
Dividing (A.24) by (A.25) and rearranging leads to






Re-inserting (A.23) leads to (15), which is the unique solution of the ﬁrst order conditions.
σy(α∗(r),r) is the minimum, since σy(α,r) is maximum at the corners α = 1 (with ρ > 0),
or ρ = 0 (with α < 1): For α = 1, we have ∂ σ2
y(1,r)/∂α = 2(µr − R1(r))R1(r) > 0,




r→0αrf(r) [−2µr (1 − α)] % 0, i.e. if r is increased from r = 0, the
variance decreases.
Equation (15) determines the set of strategies, which generate the minimum standard
deviation for any given mean income. This set may include strategies for which a higher
mean income is attainable with the same standard deviation. These are excluded in the
set of eﬃcient strategies, which is determined by α∗(r,r), where r is chosen from the
appropriate subset Ω ⊆ [0,∞) of feasible rain thresholds.14
Turning to the properties of α∗(r), for r = 0 the numerator and denominator of (15)
are equal, hence α∗(0) = 1. For r → ∞, we have, using L’Hospital’s rule repeatedly,
lim
r→∞α∗(r) = 0. Numerical computations for a wide range of parameters (µr,σr) resulted
in qualitatively the same curves α∗(r) as shown in Figure 3.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2











(2R2(r) − rR1(r))2 + α
∗2(r)rf(r) > 0.
For r → 0, we have lim
r→0R1(r) = µr and lim
r→0R2(r) = σ2
2 +µ2
r, and α∗(0) = 1. Inserting
into equations (8) and (9) yields lim
r→0µy(α∗(r),r) = 0 and lim
r→0σy(α∗(r),r) = 0.
14In the example shown in Figure 2, however, we have Ω = [0,∞).
27For r → ∞, we have lim
r→∞R1(r) = 0 and lim
r→∞R2(r) = 0, and lim
r→∞α∗(r) = 0. Inserting
into equations (8) and (9) yields lim
r→∞µy(α∗(r),r) = µr and lim
r→∞σy(α∗(r),r) = σr.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
As shown in Appendix A.5, lim
r→∞µy(α∗(r),r) = µr and lim
r→∞σy(α∗(r),r) = σr. This is the
northeast corner of the income possibility frontier, since µy = µr is the maximum possible
mean income (cf. Lemma 2).


















r2 f(r)dr − α∗(r)(2 − α∗(r))R2(r) with respect
to r and inserting the expressions for dα∗(r)/dr and µ2
y(α∗(r),r)/dr leads with some
rearrangement to dσ2






−2µy(α∗(r),r) + r(2 − α∗(r))
. (A.26)















For r → 0 both the mean income µy(α∗(r,r) and the standard deviation of income
σy(α∗(r,r) vanish (cf. Appendix A.5). Since both cannot be negative, this is the southwest
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For r = 0, and any given α, we have





r + 2αµr R1(0) − α
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i.e. the straight line between (µy,σy) = (0,0) (α = 1) and (µy,σy) = (µr,σr) (α = 0)
is always within the income possibility set. Since for r = 0 the standard deviation is
28σy
µy











































Figure 8: σy(α∗(r),r) and µy(α∗(r),r) computed for parameters (µr,σr) = (φ · ξ,ξ). ξ
varies between 0.1 and 7.1 in steps of 1, ξ = 7.1 being the curve on top in each case. φ is
0.5 for Figure 8 on the top left, 1 on the top right, and 2 and 8 on the bottom left and
right, respectively. Details about the procedure in the text.
maximum for given mean income (cf. Appendix A.6), the income possibility frontier is
located above this straight line.
To show numerically that the income possibility frontier may be divided into two
domains – the convex domain for small σy and the concave domain for large σy –, we
computed σy(α∗(r),r) and µy(α∗(r),r) for parameters (µr,σr) = (φ·ξ,ξ), where ξ varies
between 0.1 and 7.1 in steps of 1 and φ ∈ {0.5,1,2,8}.15 In order to get the data points
equally distributed in the σy-µy-space, we calculated them for r = ψ·(ξ+0.5), ψ varying
between 0.01 and 20 in steps of 0.2. The results, which provide evidence for the assertion
of the lemma, are shown in Figure 8. Note that the left borders of the respective income
possibility sets are shown, whereas the income possibility frontiers are the upper parts of
these curves. That is, the income possibility frontier has a jump, where the left border of
the income possibility set is inwardly curved to the right (e.g. the curves at the bottom
15The idea is to scan the parameter space by varying µr and σr along straight lines with diﬀerent slope
through the origin of the (µr,σr)-space.
29right of Figure 8).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
To prove part (i), we show that (a) the optimal indiﬀerence curve is convex over the
whole range σy ∈ [0,σr], and (b) the optimum is within the concave domain of the
income possibility frontier.
Ad (a). Rearranging Equation (A.19) yields the following expression for the optimal
indiﬀerence curve (where µ∗



























By assumption, this condition is fulﬁlled for µy = µr on the indiﬀerence curve which
intersects (µr,σr), i.e. which is below the optimal one. Since µy ≤ µr for all eﬃcient
strategies, this condition is fulﬁlled for all µy on the optimal indiﬀerence curve.
Ad (b). The minimum slope of the income possibility frontier in the convex domain
(i.e. at the southwest border) is µr/σr (Lemma 3). The slope of the indiﬀerence curve at
the optimum (µ∗
y,σ∗









































where the inequality µr/σr < µ∗
y/σ∗
y holds as a consequence of Lemma 3, and the expres-
sion on the left hand side of the last inequality is the slope of the indiﬀerence curve at
the optimum (cf. Equation A.20). Hence, the optimum cannot be in the convex domain
of the income possibility frontier.
Ad (ii). For ρ = 0, the indiﬀerence curves are horizontal lines. Hence, the maximum of
the income possibility frontier, which is at the corner (µy,σy) = (µr,σr), is the optimum.
For ρ > 0 corner solutions are excluded. At the corner (µy,σy) = (µr,σr) the slope
of the income possibility frontier is zero (Lemma 3), whereas the indiﬀerence curves have
a positive slope, provided ρ > 0. At the corner (µy,σy) = (0,0), the income possibility
frontier is increasing with a slope µr/σr (Lemma 3), but the slope of the indiﬀerence
curves is zero for σr = 0 (cf. Appendix A.3).
30A.8 Proof of Result 1
We have shown that the unique optimum is in the concave domain of the income pos-
sibility frontier (Appendix A.7), and that the slope of the farmer’s indiﬀerence curves
increases with ρ (Appendix A.3). Thus, the optimal mean income µ∗
y decreases if ρ in-
creases. Since for eﬃcient strategies the mean µ∗
y is increasing in r, the rain threshold r∗
of the optimal strategy decreases if ρ increases.
A.9 Proof of Result 2
The aim of this section is to show in a sensitivity analysis how the qualitative results shown
in Figure 6 and stated in Result 2 depend on the parameters of the model. The sensitivity
analysis was performed using a Monte Carlo approach, repeating the computations with
multiple randomly selected parameter sets. We focussed on three parameters, namely
the growth parameter of green biomass wG, the inﬂuence c of grazing on the growth of
reserve biomass, and the standard deviation σr of rainfall. The other parameters either
aﬀect the outcomes in the same direction as the selected parameters (this is the case for
the growth parameter of the reserve biomass wR and the expected value of rainfall µr),
or in the inverse direction (this is the case for the death rate of the reserve biomass d).16
Hence their variation enables no further insights.
A sample size of N = 20 parameter sets was created according to the Latin Hypercube
sampling method (Saltelli et al. 2000).17 The three parameters were assumed to be
independent uniformly distributed, with 0 ≤ wG ≤ 5, 0 ≤ σr ≤ 2.4 and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, the
upper bounds for wG and σr are guesses which proved to be suitable. The respective
simulation results were compared to the results shown in Figure 6. The following types
of long-term dynamics of mean reserve biomass and mean income (distinct from those
stated in Result 2) were found:18
16For the two parameters K and R, no substancial inﬂuence is to be expected: they just rescale the
problem.
17This method, by stratifying the parameter space into N strata, ensures that each parameter has all
proportions of its distribution represented in the sample parameter sets.
18To illustrate them, additional calculations were done, where one parameter was chosen diﬀerently
from the original parameter set of Figure 6 in each case.
31(i) If the growth parameter of the green biomass wG is very low, i.e. if wG·wR < d, the
reserve biomass is not able to persist at all. Keeping livestock is not possible, independent






































































Figure 9: Parameter values are as in Figure 6, except for c = 0.9.
(ii) If the impact c of grazing on the growth of the reserve biomass is very high,
the mean reserve biomass declines to zero in ﬁnite time, unless the grazing management






































































Figure 10: Parameter values are as in Figure 6, except for wG = 4.
(iii) If the growth parameter of the green biomass is very high or the impact of grazing
on the growth of the reserve biomass is very low, the future mean income is the higher
the less conservative the strategy is, i.e. resting is not required to preserve the ecosystem.
This is illustrated in Figure 10 for a very high growth rate of the biomass, wG = 4.






































































Figure 11: Parameter values are as in Figure 6, except for σr = 0.05.
(iv) If the standard deviation of rainfall σr is very small, resting is almost deterministic:
for r > µr, resting will take place in hardly any year, such that µR and µy are independent
of the strategy. For r < µr, resting will take place in almost every year, i.e. the share α∗(r)
of rested paddocks determines the outcome, as illustrated in Figure 11 for σr = 0.05.
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